Abstract-The communication of a wireless sensor network can be eavesdropped quite easily due to its properties, thereby requiring a security mechanism. Adding a key management scheme on the wireless sensor network is a kind of solution. This paper proposes a method to enhance the security of the existing random key pre-distribution scheme, that is considered to be suitable in wireless sensor networks. Using a little additional memory and computation, the proposed approach reduces the amount of information revealed when a sensor node is captured and thus makes a wireless sensor network that uses the random key pre-distribution scheme more secure. We analyze the proposed approaches by considering two measurements: ACL (number of additional compromised links) and AID (the average insecurity degree). ACL measures the resilience against the node capturing problem and AID measures the security of each link key. The experimental results match the analysis and show that the security of the wireless sensor network is enhanced about 50%.
, [12] , [13] . Some of them are considered to be quite practicable, although they have some defects. The random key pre-distribution (RKP) scheme in [15] is one of them and constructs a key pool which consists of a large number of keys. Each sensor node then randomly picks a certain number of keys from the key pool and stores them into its memory before it is deployed. The basic idea of this scheme is that any two sensor nodes have a probability of picking the same key from the key pool and this key can be used as their link key if these two sensor nodes want to establish a secure communication. Many key management schemes follow this basic idea with some modification, including the q-composite scheme [16] , the key management scheme using deployment knowledge [14] , the polynomial based scheme [17] , and the key matrix based scheme [18] .
The contributions of this paper is that it proposed a method to improve the security of the existing random key predistribution scheme. Combining the proposed method with the original scheme, this paper proposed an enhancement scheme. Furthermore, the proposed method can be used on other RKP based key management schemes. This paper also provide analysis on two measurements on the security issue along with the simulation results. This rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the original RKP scheme and the idea of hash function. Section III demonstrates the problem this paper tries to solve and the proposed scheme. Section IV evaluates the performance of the proposed and original schemes using two measurements on security, namely the ACL and AID. Section V shows the experimental results on ACL and AID of both schemes. Section VI concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORKS

A. The RKP Scheme
The random key pre-distribution scheme is considered to be a suitable key management scheme for wireless sensor networks. It consists of three main phases as follows.
1) Phase 1: This phase is executed before the sensor nodes are deployed and is usually called the key predistribution phase. In this phase, a key pool which consists of a large number of keys will first be generated. Each of the keys in the key pool will have a unique key-id. After the key pool is generated, each sensor node will randomly pick a certain amount of keys without deleting them from the key pool and store the chosen keys into its memory as its own key ring. Note that, for any two sensor nodes, there is a probability to have a same key. After all of the sensor nodes have derived their key rings, they will be deployed into the sensing field.
2) Phase 2: This phase is often also referred to as the shared key discovery phase. In Phase 1, the keys are pre-installed into the memory of each sensor nodes. After the sensor nodes are deployed, the shared key discovery phase starts. In this phase, each node will try to find a common key with all of its neighbors. When a sensor node u wants to find a shared key with its own neighbors, it sends a message containing the key-ids of the keys in its key ring to all of its neighbors. When a neighboring node v receives this message, node v tries to find a shared key by comparing the key-ids in the message and in its key ring.
3) Phase 3:
The last phase is also called the path key establishment phase. When two neighboring sensor nodes can not find a shared key, they will perform the third phase. In this phase, any two neighboring sensor nodes will try to establish a path key if they can not find a shared key in the previous phase. We use (u, v) to denote that nodes u and v are neighbors and they have a shared key. When two neighboring sensor nodes w and z have no shared key and want to establish a path key, they will try to find a secure path, consisting of a series of pairs of neighboring sensor nodes having shared keys. In other words, a path (w, w 1 ), (w 1 , w 2 ), ..., (w n−1 , w n ), (w n , z) from w to z will be found. If all of the messages between w and z are transmitted through this path afterwards, it will consume too much resources because it requires multiple times of encryption and decryption each time to send a single message. Therefore, they must use this path to agree on a path key as their encryption key. The path key can be generated by any one of the two sensor nodes and sent to the other one through this path. The easiest way to generate such a path key is to use one of the sensor node's keys in its key ring that does not belong to its shared keys. When the two nodes have agree on a path key, they can use this path key as their link key. Figure 1 shows the algorithm of the three phases in the RKP scheme.
B. Hash Functions
In order to enhance the security of the two original schemes, the idea of hash function is very much helpful. A cryptographic hash function H() is a function that is considered to have the following prerequisite properties: 1) Preimage resistant: Given the output k ′ , it should be hard to find any k such that k ′ = H(k).
Phase 1
(1) Generate the key pool and each node randomly choose keys from the key pool for its key ring. (2) Each node must also store the key-ids as well. 2) Collision resistant: It should be hard to find two different messages k 1 and k 2 such that H(k 1 ) = H(k 2 ). Although any kind of function that satisfies the above two properties can be used for the proposed method, we will consider the well-known hash functions as the first priority. The most popular hash functions includes the MD5 (MessageDigest algorithm 5) designed by Ronald Rivest in 1992 and the SHA-1 designed by the National Security Agency in 1995. However, these two hash functions are considered not entirely secured and may have some security threat [19] , [20] , [21] . Therefore, this paper uses the SHA-2 algorithm which is another hash function in the SHA series for the proposed scheme.
III. PROBLEM AND PROPOSED SOLUTION
In a wireless sensor network, the sensor nodes can be easily captured by an attacker. All of the information in the captured sensor nodes will thus be revealed and the attacker can obtain the encryption keys. We refer to this problem as the node capturing problem. For the key management schemes which are not based on the RKP scheme, the sensor nodes only store their own link keys. When a sensor node is captured, only its own link keys will be revealed. In contrast, for the random key pre-distribution based schemes, the node capturing problem leads to the following problem. Recall that, in RKP based schemes, each sensor node stores its own link keys and some other possible link keys. When a sensor node is captured, the link keys that are not used by this sensor node may be revealed. In other words, when a sensor node is captured in a wireless sensor network using the RKP scheme, this captured node will reveal additional information about the link keys of the other sensor nodes.
The node capturing problem is inevitable in a wireless sensor network. In order to alleviate the impact of node capturing problem for the RKP based schemes, this paper proposes a simple but effective approach to enhance the security. The basic idea of the proposed approach is to hash the keys in the key pool of the random key pre-distribution scheme with a one-way hash function. Once a key is chosen by a sensor node, it will be hashed by the predefined one-way hash function. If another sensor node chooses the same key afterwards, instead of using the same key as the previous sensor node, it will derive a new different key by hashing the key value. If the new hashed key has been selected, the key value will be hashed again to become a new key. When a sensor node is captured, it will not reveal the keys of the other sensor nodes since the one-way hash function is not invertible. We therefore refer to the proposed approach as the RKP scheme by hashing (RKP-H).
The RKP-H scheme also consists of three main phases: 1) Phase 1: A key pool will also be generated first for each sensor node to pick keys randomly like the RKP scheme. After a sensor node picks a key from the key pool, this key will be hashed using a pre-defined oneway hash function H. By doing so, when another sensor node tries to pick the same key again, it will get the hashed key instead of the exact same key. In addition, the key pool and each sensor node's key rings will not only store the keys and the key-ids, but also the number of times that the keys are hashed. Each node will store the predefined hash function H. For example, suppose node u chooses the key with key-id i for its key ring. Key k i will be stored in u's key ring and k i will be replaced with H(k i ) in the key pool. If node v also chooses the key with key-id i for its key ring afterward, node v will get H(k i ) instead of k i . The keys with key-id i in node u and v will be k i and H(k i ) = k ′ i , respectively. 2) Phase 2: Like the basic random key pre-distribution scheme, any two neighboring sensor nodes will try to find a shared key for communication in this phase. When a sensor node wants to find a shared key with its neighbors, the message it sends will not only contains the key-ids but also the number of times each key is hashed. The neighbor receiving such a message will first compare the key-ids. If it finds a same key-id, it will then compare the number of times that the key is hashed. If the key it holds is hashed more times, it will decide to use its key as the shared key and send back a message containing the key's key-id and how many times the original sensor node should hash its key with the specific key-id in order to get the shared key. If the key it holds is hashed less times, it will obtain the shared key by hashing the key it holds and send back the key id and specifies that the original sensor node does not need to hash its key. For example, suppose the nodes u and v mentioned in the previous phase are neighbors. They can establish their shared key H(k i ) in this phase. Node u can obtain H(k i ) by hashing the key k i in its key ring, and node v already has H(k i ) in its key ring. the previous phase, there is barely any modification in this phase. Any two neighboring sensor nodes that do not have a shared key will also try to find a secure path to agree on a path key as described in the basic random key pre-distribution scheme. Figure 2 shows the algorithm of the three phases in the RKP-H scheme. The notations used in the algorithm is as follows: k i is the key with key id i, H() is the predefined hash function, h is the number of times that a key is hashed, and m is the difference between two hs.
IV. ANALYSIS
In order to measure the performance of our proposed approach, we consider two measurements: (1) the number of additional compromised links, ACL, and (2) the average insecurity degree, AID. The ACL measures the resilience against the node capturing problem by finding the fraction of additional communications that an attacker can compromise based on the information retrieved from the captured nodes. The AID measures, for each link key, how many other nodes will the reveal information about that shared key when they are captured.
A. Additional Compromised Links
Assume that when a sensor node is captured, the probability that any key k is compromised is p 1 . The probability that any key k is not compromised when a node is compromised will be (1 − p 1 ). When x nodes are captured, the probability that any key k is not compromised will be (1 − p 1 ) x . The expected fraction of total keys being compromised when x nodes are captured is 1 − (1 − p 1 ) x , which is the ACL for the RKP and RKP-H scheme. Now we have to find the value of p 1 for both schemes in order to obtain the true ACL value.
Let S k be the set of the keys that has the same key-id as key k and is sorted in the order that each key was been picked.
In the RKP scheme, no matter which location k is located, it will reveal |S k | − 1 keys if the node that possesses k is captured where |S k | is the size of S k . Therefore, the p 1 of k is |S k | − 1. In the RKP-H scheme if k is located first in S k , it will reveal |S k | − 1 other keys if the node that possesses k is captured since other keys in |S k | are hashed less times than k. Likewise, if k is located last in S k , it will reveal 0 other keys. The p 1 of k in the RKP-H scheme is
Let P be the key pool size and r be the key ring size. The probability that any key k is compromised when a node is captured will be r P in the RKP scheme. In the RKP-H scheme, the value will become 1 2 × r P according to the previous analysis. Therefore, the expected fraction of total keys being compromised in the RKP and RKP-H scheme will be 1 − (1 − r P )
x and 1
x respectively when x sensor nodes are captured.
B. Average Insecure Degree
This part of analysis will evaluate the AID value for all of the schemes. The AID measures, for each link key, the number of nodes that will reveal information about the link key if they are captured. The notations used in the analysis are as follows: j is the key id of key k j , T j is the set of nodes that selected the key with key id j, |T j | is the size of T j , and N is the network size. We assume that the nodes in T j are sorted in the order that they selected the key. That is, the key possessed by the node in front of T j is hashed less times than in the back.
Assume that the two nodes use k j as their link key are node u and v, and u is in the front of v in T j . For the RKP scheme, there are |Tj | 2 possible combinations of u and v in T j . For each combination, there are (|T j | − 2) nodes that will reveal information about key k j . The AID for k j is
As for the entire network, the AID will be (N −2)r P . In the RKP-H scheme, not all of the nodes that belong to T j will reveal k j when they are been captured. It depends on the position of the captured node and the two nodes that use k j in T j . If the two nodes u and v are the first two nodes in T j , no other nodes in T j will reveal k j since that all other keys with key-id j are hashed more times than the link key k j . If v is the third node and u is the first or second node, there is one node which is the first node in T j that will reveal k j . If we keep on calculating for the rest of the combinations, the result of the total number of nodes that will reveal k j will be combinations in total, the average AID of the link key k j is
Since
Equation (1) can be written as
, and Equation(2) will be
Thus, the AID for k j is 2 3 · (|T j | − 2) in the RKP-H scheme which is 2 3 of the RKP scheme. As for the entire network, the AID will be Table 1 shows the ACL and AID for both schemes.
V. SIMULATIONS
In addition to the analysis, we perform the experimental simulation. We use C++ programming language for the simulations. The sensor network and all sensor nodes are simulated with different measurements depending on each simulation. All the results match what we have analyzed. We here present two fundamental results due to the space. Figure 3 shows the results on the ACL about the RKP scheme and the proposed RKP-H scheme. In this experiment set, the number of sensor nodes is 10,000, the key pool size is 100,000, and the key ring size is 200 with a probability 0.33 to set up a link. As shown in the plot, the value of ACL grows as the number of capture sensor nodes increases for both schemes. The RKP-H can reduce the ACL in about 50%. Figure 4 presents the performance of the RKP scheme and the RKP-H scheme in terms of AID. In this experiment set, the number of sensor nodes is 1,000 and the key pool size is 10,000. We consider the AID values with different key ring sizes. A general trend is that the AID value increases as the key ring size becomes bigger. Furthermore, the AID values of RKP-H are about 30% less than the AID values of RKP.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper considers the RKP scheme and focuses on the node capturing problem. The proposed method RKP-H outperforms the RKP scheme in terms of ACL and AID measurements and can reduce the amount of information revealed when a sensor node is captured for about 30% to 50%. What the proposed approach pays is a little additional computation and memory cost. Each sensor node only needs to store the predefined one-way hash function and performs this hash function several times at the key setup phase. The results of the experimental simulation match the analytical results. And the proposed method also can be adapted to other random key pre-distribution based schemes including the q-composite scheme and the key management scheme using deployment knowledge which we are currently working on.
